Twenty-five days after receiving the Armour product, the patient developed a viral syndrome and was found to be positive for HIV. Retrospective testing showed that he was HIV negative on the initial admission for his leg injury in 1985. Earlier, DHF had developed case definition criteria to assist in the identification of individuals possibly infected by heat-treated products (Table 1). Although highly suspect, the patient’s prior drug use prevented a perfect fit with the case definition

criteria [23]. Unknown to DHF and UNC investigators in early 1986, Armour, during July–December 1985, had already Staurosporine manufacturer received reports from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands of several other possible seroconversions in patients receiving Armour’s heat-treated products. While some had received other heat-treated products, the

patients had all received the Armour product heated at 60°C for 30 h. When DHF learned of the UNC patient and began to investigate in January 1986, Armour did not volunteer information concerning the European cases to DHF. However, Dr Peter Jones, director of the Newcastle Hemophilia Center in the UK, knew of the Armour-associated cases in Europe. At an AIDS conference held in Newcastle-upon-Tyne in February 1986, Dr Jones voiced concerns about the efficacy of heat treatment methods [24]. Subsequent publication of his remarks in the general circulation newspapers resulted in an uproar in the UK haemophilia community and the British government initiated enquiries directly to Armour about its product. Selleckchem ABT199 Almost simultaneously (25 February 1986), Armour met with the FDA to review the possible use the HIV ELISA test to screen donors of

source plasma used for Armour’s ‘Generation I’ clotting factor concentrate to improve safety. Armour had been testing donors of source plasma for HIV since May 1985, but considerable Armour concentrate, made from unscreened donors remained in the production sequence or public circulation [22]. At the meeting, Armour reportedly MCE公司 informed the FDA of the possible European cases, but the FDA indicated they did not consider these cases to be ‘clear cut’ seroconversions associated with Armour’s heat-treated products. Unaware of Dr Prince’s studies, the FDA reviewed the latest Meloy Laboratory data from December 1985; based on Meloy’s report, FDA assumed 5 logs of inactivation by Armour’s heat treatment process (3 logs by heating and 2 logs by lyophilization) should be sufficient viral inactivation so that Armour’s product manufactured from unscreened plasma did not need to be withdrawn from the market [22]. However, 2 days later, Armour’s internal plasma executive committee made a decision to voluntarily withhold products made from unscreened plasma unless it was the only product available to sell. No voluntary or mandatory recall was issued [22].